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Abstract 
T.he purpose of this study was to investigate the 
relationship of levels of moral reasoning and of locus of 
control to changes in moral reasoning in a situation where 
external pressure is present. It was hypothesized that 
changes in moral reasoning would be toward higher levels 
of reasoning. A second hypothesis was that a person's 
locus of control related to that person's resistance to 
change moral reasoning in a situation where pressure to 
change that reasoning was exerted. 
Subjects in the study were 88 students at a large New 
England community college. At pre-test sessions an 
original large sample of subjects was administered the 
Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 
1966) and the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979). Subjects 
were classified as Internal or External by splitting the 
sample at the median of their scores on the Rotter Scale 
(Mdn. = 10). Subjects were classified as high or low 
reasoners depending on their original P-scores on the DIT. 
The P-score represents the magnitude of a respondent's 
preference for principled moral issues (Stages Sa, Sb 
and 6) in deciding the course of action to be followed in 
a moral dilemma. High reasoners had original P-scores in 
the third and fourth quartiles; low reasoners had original 
P-scores in the first and second quartiles. 
Subjects were paired for the post-test or consensus 
session. Pairing matched high reasoners with low 
reasoners in four groups. In two groups high reasoners 
were Internals. One group matched a high reasoning 
Internal with a low reasoning External (DiffLOC); the 
other matched a high reasoning Internal with a low 
reasoning Internal (SameLOC). Two other groups had 
Externals for high reasoners. One matched a ,high 
reasoning External with a low reasoning Internal (DiffLOC) 
while the other matched a high reasoning External with a 
low reasoning External (SameLOC). At this session 
subjects were given their original DIT answers (pre-test) 
and paired subjects were instructed to discuss their 
original answers and come to an agreed upon answer for 
each item (consensus score). From their independently 
obtained scores and their consensus scores, change scores 
were derived for each subject. 
Analysis of the results indicated strong support for 
the first hypothesis. There was a significant difference 
between the change scores of low reasoners and the change 
scores of high reasoners. The main effect of Locus of 
Control was not significant. However, being paired with a 
person of same or different locus of control differen-
tially affected changes in P-scores. Locus of Control was 
important only when that reasoner was a high External 
paired with an Internal. When that combination occurred, 
Externals changed significantly more. 
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Statement of the Problem 
1 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors 
that influence moral reasoning. For centuries morality 
has been the central category for defining social 
relationships and development. The social sciences were 
called the "moral sciences." These depicted the moral 
principles which underlie social arrangements, practices 
and institutions in society. "Moral rules and principles 
regulate the basic relationships among people in terms of 
allocating rights (what kinds of claims a person can make 
on others in his own interest) and allocating 
responsibilities (the claims that others can make on their 
behalf from the person)" (Rest, 1979a, p. 18). A crucial 
ingredient in this social design is the m~ral reasoning 
_that provides the plan for such allocation of the benefits 
and responsibilities of social collaboration. 
With the rise of the psychoanalytic movement, the 
early 1900's witnessed a focusing on the superego, the 
"guilt of Freud," as the source of conscience or morality. 
In this focus, any intellectual dimension was almost 
completely missing; the emotion of guilt served as the 
basic motive for morality. 
At about the same time that Hartshorne and May (1928) 
were investigating the moral behavior of children, Piaget 
(1932) d~veloped and published his theory of the moral 
2 
judgment of the child. Piaget claimed that there is an 
orderly and logical pattern in the development of 
children's moral judgment, a pattern that is associated 
with children's intellectual growth. Further research into 
the questions concerning moral development was relatively 
inactive until the late 1950's. 
Renewed interest in the question of morality in 
public life grew in the wake of World War II when 
activities at concentration camps were studied and 
sometimes defended as "carrying out orders." Vietnam, 
Watergate and, more recently, government involvement in 
the affairs of the Philippines, in Nicaragua and in the 
Middle East have raised the national consciousness of the 
need for moral referents and of the need for understanding 
the origins and nature of moral reasoning and behavior. 
Kohlberg, one of the leaders of research in moral 
development has elaborated Piagets's cognitive-develop-
mental theory of moral reasoning to include six stages and 
ages of development. Attaining a more advanced stage 
depends upon the earlier attainment of the preceding stage 
and, consequently, the restructuring and displacement of 
that previous stage (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg stresses 
and offers evidence of the role that social interactions 
play in changing the moral reasoning of individuals 
(Kohlberg, Scharf, & Hickey, 1972). 
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Elliot Turiel, wh i le studying the question of an 
invariant sequence of stages of moral reasoning, looked at 
factors that influence changes in moral reasoning. 
Presenting reasoning that was either above or below the 
identified stage level of his subjects, he tested the 
implication that changes would be toward the next higher 
stage. He also tested the implication that subjects would 
resist lower stage reasoning (Turiel, 1966). Rest, 
Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) also examined factors that 
promote changes in moral reasoning. Their results 
demonstrated that subjects preferred moral judgments that 
were one or two stages above their own identified stage. 
Their highest preference was determined by their 
comprehension. 
Another area of research that has received consider-
able attention is that concerning the construct of Locus 
of Control. Since the publication of Rotter's (1966) 
article in Psychological Monographs, much research has 
been conducted on the expectancy of internal-external 
control of reinforcement and Rotter's work has become one 
of the most influential in contemporary psychology. 
Testimony to this can be found in the frequency that 
Rotter's monograph has been cited. 
It is the purpose of this study to investigate the 
role of the personality variable of locus of control as a 
factor which influences when and how a person will make 
changes in moral judgments. Rotter describes a locus of 
✓ 
control orientation as a belief that the outcomes of a 
person's actions are contingent on what that person does 
(internal control orientation) or on events outside that 
individual's personal control (external control 
orientation). Eichmann (Arendt, 1963) and Calley 
4 
(Esper, 1988) both pointed to an external control, the 
law, as reason for their actions in Germany and MyLai, 
respectively. What they were asked to do was legitimate. 
Milgram's experiments in the early 1960's demonstrated 
what history makes obvious, harmful behavior can occur on 
demand (Milgram, 1963). The twentieth anniversary of 
MyLai reminded the world of that. 
Sometimes lost in the accounts of the MyLai massacre 
is another reminder that not everyone responds the . same 
way in the same situation. According to an Associated 
Press report, "Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson landed his 
helicopter ... and ordered his crew to fire on American 
infantrymen if they fired on the Vietnamese," the 12 to 16 
Vietnamese women, children and old men Thompson was trying 
to evacuate (Esper, p. A-12). For Thompson the control 
for his behavior was internal. His reasoning about his 
action is not included in Esper's report. What, if any, 
factors can account for Thompson's refusal to obey a 
command and change his moral judgment about the command? 
What factors may have influenced Calley to act otherwise? 
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From a common sense point of view, locus of control 
would seem to be related to the ability to resist 
coercion. This study is an extension of the Turiel 
investigation and that of Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg. It 
examines the relationship between an individual's locus of 
control and changes in that person's moral reasoning in a 
situation where external pressure is present in an effort 
to influence that person to change his/her moral 
reasoning. 
CHAPTER II 
Background Theory and Research 
Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moral Development 
6 
The fundamental assumptions of the cognitive-
developmental approach to moral judgment research are that 
a person's moral judgments reflect an underlying 
organization of thinking and that these organizations 
develop through a definite succession of transformations. 
Inherent to the cognitive-developmental paradigm are two 
major concepts. The first of these is that a person's 
perception of reality is cognitively structured. The 
second concept is that cognitive structures evolve - that 
is, there is a developmental progression in which earlier 
cognitive structures are elaborated to accommodate greater 
complexity in experience. 
Piaget's (1932) classic study, The Moral Judgment of 
the Child, provided the basis for much of the current 
psychological research in the area of moral judgment. His 
cognitive-developmental approach supplied a conceptual 
framework for the study of the growth of moral thought, 
and his method of posing problems for children and 
observing their responses furnished a widely-used 
technique for measuring moral reasoning levels. 
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Piaget's Theory of Moral Development 
Assuming morality to be a matter of justice, Piaget 
defined morality as respect for rules and as the fair 
application of rules to those who constructed them as well 
as to those to whom the rules applied. Moral judgment 
involves an understanding of the rules of justice and 
fairness by which a society functions (Piaget, 1965). 
Piaget stated that there is an orderly and logical 
pattern in the development of children's moral judgments 
and that this development is based on the sequential 
changes associated with children's intellectual growth. 
He reasoned that moral development occurs as children act 
upon, transform and modify the world they live in. They, 
in turn, are transformed and modified by the consequences 
of their actions. 
Piage~'s Two-Stage Model of Moral Reasoning. Piaget 
provided a two-stage theory of moral development. Accord-
ing to his model, an individual at different ages will 
demonstrate qualitatively different cognitive construc-
tions when reasoning about the morality of situations. 
Piaget (1965) hypothesized the following two stages 
of morality: 
1. Heteronomous morality: The first stage, that of 
heteronomous morality, emerges from the unequal inter-
actions between children and adults and represents the 
earliest stage of development wherein the child 
demonstrates an awareness of rules. Viewed as a morality 
of constraint, heteronomous morality results from the 
interaction of cognitive immaturity and unquestioning 
emotional respect for adults. In this context children 
develop a conception of moral rules as absolute and 
unchanging. 
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2. Autonomous morality: Children progress from the 
first stage of moral development to a stage of autonomous 
morality. Whereas heteronomous morality evolves from 
unequal relationships, autonomous morality, or the 
morality of cooperation, arises from the interaction among 
equals. Piaget maintains that social interchanges under 
conditions of mutual respect and equality, coupled with 
general intellectual growth and a weakening in the 
constraints of adult authority, create a morality 
characterized by rationality, flexibility and social 
consciousness. Social consciousness revolves around a 
sense of justice - concern for equality, for the rights of 
others and for reciprocity in human relations (Piaget, 
1965). 
In the Piagetian view all children will move from a 
premoral stage to the stage of autonomous morality unless 
development is retarded or hindered by severe social 
deprivation. For Piaget moral development has a basic 
cognitive-structural or moral judgmental component. An 
individual's basic cognitive structures change as an 
individual develops. These structures represent 
qualitative rather than quantitative organizations of 
9 
thought processes. Just as moral development depends upon 
stimulation defined in cognitive-structural terms, this 
stimulation must also be social, "the kind that comes from 
social interaction and from moral decision-making, moral 
dialogue, and moral interaction" (Lickona, 1976, p. 49). 
Traditionally, cognitive-developmental theorists have 
relied on the specific criteria of a hard structural stage 
model in identifying Piagetian cognitive stages. These 
criteria include: 
(1) Stages imply a distinction or 
qualitative difference in structures (modes of 
thinking) that still serve the same basic 
function (for example, intelligence) at various 
points in development. 
(2) These different structures form an 
invariant sequence, order, or succession in 
individual development. While cultural factors 
may speed up, slow down, or stop development, 
they do not change its sequence. 
(3) Each of these different and sequential 
modes of thought forms a 'structural whole.' A 
given stage response on a task does not just 
represent a specific response determined by 
knowledge and familiarity with that task or 
tasks similar to it; rather, it represents an 
underlying thought-organization. The 
implication is that various aspects of stage 
structures should appear as a consistent cluster 
of responses in development. 
(4) Stages are hierarchical integrations. 
As noted, stages form an order of increasingly 
differentiated and integrated structures to 
fulfill a common function. Accordingly, higher 
stages displace (or, rather, integrate) the 
structures found at lower stages. 
(Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983, p. 31) 
Kohlberg's Six-Stage Model of Moral Reasoning 
The most influential and systematic extension of 
Piaget's theory has been Kohlberg's cognitive-
developmental theory of moral reasoning. Kohlberg 
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outlines stages that cover the range of moral development 
from childhood through adulthood. In his theory Kohlberg 
subdivides Piaget's stages of moral reasoning and he 
extends them to include more advanced development. 
For Kohlberg, the primary theoretical definition of 
structural moral development is that of an organism 
passing through invariant sequential stages. A more 
advanced stage is dependent upon the earlier attainment of 
the preceding stage and consequently, the restructuring 
and displacement of that previous stage (Kohlberg, 1969). 
In the course of acquiring new modes of thinking, 
individuals experience alternating periods of transition 
and consolidation as higher stages of reasoning displace 
structures used at lower stages. Such restructuring and 
displacement result from a stimulation that comes from 
social interaction (Kohlberg, 1976). In the process of 
restructuring or reorganizing internal thought patterns, 
"change factors include (a) 'pure' cognitive growth to a 
higher logical stage, (b) social-cognitive growth through 
opportunities for enlarged role-taking and (c) experiences 
of cognitive-moral conflict between one's own moral 
reasoning and those of others" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 428). 
Six Stages of Reasoning. The six moral stages, 
proposed by Kohlberg, are grouped into three major levels. 
The first level, preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2) 
includes most children under 9, some adolescents, and many 
11 
criminal offenders. The conventional level (Stages 3 
and 4) is the level of most adolescents and adults. The 
postconventional level (Stages 5 and 6) includes a 
minority of adults (Kohlberg in Lickona, 1976). 
Since the levels are organized around the term 
"conventional," i.e., conforming to and upholding the 
rules and expectations of society, one might consider the 
levels as depicting different types of relationships 
between the individual and society's rules and 
expectations. In Level I, the rules and expectations are 
external to the self. At Level II, the self has 
identified with or has internalized those rules and 
expectations, especially those of authority figures. 
Level III includea those who define their values in terms 
of self-chosen principles after having differentiated 
themselves from the rules and expectations of others. 
Within each level, the second stage is a more advanced 
form of moral reasoning. Table 1 lists the six stages and 
describes what Kohlberg explains as the reasoning at each 
stage for upholding what is right and the social 
perspective behind each stage. 
TABLE 1 The Six ~lora 1 Stages 
Content of Stage 
Level and Stage What Is 
Right 



















To avoid breaking 
rules backed by 
punishment, obedi-
ence for its own 
sake, and avoiding 
physical damage to 
persons and prop-
erty. 
Following rules only 
when it is to some-
one's inmediate 
interest, acting to 
meet one's own in-
terests and needs 
and letting others 
do the same. Right 
is also what's 
fair, what's an 
equal exchange, a 
deal, an agreement. 
Living up to what is 
expected by people 
close to you or what 
people generally ex• 
pect of people in 
your role as son, 
brother, friend, etc. 
•ae1n9 good• is i111-
port1nt and ll'll!ans 
having good 110tives, 
showing concern about 
others. It also 
•ans keeping mutual 
relationships, such 
as trust, loyalty, 





ment, and the superior 
power of authorities. 
To serve one's own 
needs or interests in 
a world where you have 
to recognize that other 
people have their 
interests, too. 
The need to be a good 
person tn your own eyes 
and those of others. 
Your caring for others. 
Belief in the Golden 
Rule. Desire to main-
tain rules and authority 
which support stereo-
typical good behavior. 
Social Perspective 
of Stage 
Egocentric point of 
view. Doesn' t con-
sider the interests 
of others or recog-
nize that they dif-
fer from the actor's: 
doesn't relate two 
points of view. Ac-
tions are considered 
physically rather 
than in tenns of psy-
chological interests 
of others. Confusion 
of authority's per-




Aware that everybody 
has his owr. interest 
to pursue and these 
conflict, so that 
right is relative 
(in the concrete 
individualistic 
sense). 
Perspective of the 
individual in rela-
tionships with other 
individuals. Aware 
of shared feelings, 
agreements, and ex-
pectations which 
take primacy over in-
dividual interests. 
Relates points of 
view through the con-
crete Golden Rule, 
putting yourself in 
the other guy' s shoe! 




















actual duties to 
which you have 
agreed. Laws are 
to be upheld ex-
cept in extreme 
cases where they 
conflict with 
other fixed social 
duties. Right is 
also contributing 
to society. the 
group. or insti-
tution. 
Being aware that 
people hold a 
variety of values 
and opinions. that 
most va 1 ues and 
rules are relative 
to your group. 
These relative rules 
should usually be 
upheld. ho~ver. in 
the interes: of im-
partiality and 
because they are the 
social contract. 
Some nonrelative 
values and riohtS 
like life and-liber-
ty. however. must be 
upheld in any society 





laws or social agree-
ments are usually 
valid because they 
rest on such princi• 
ples. When laws 
violate these prin-
ciples. one acts 1n 
accordance with the 
principle. Princi-
ples are universal 
principles of jus-
tice: the equality of 
hUlllln rights and re• 
spect for the dignity 




To keep the institution 
going as I whole. to 
avoid the breakdown in 
the system "if every-
one did it." or the 
imperative of conscience 
to meet one's defined 
obligations. 
A sense of obligation 
to law because of one's 
social contract to make 
and abide by laws for 
the welfare of all and 
for the protection of 
all people's rights. A 
feeling of contractual 
co11111itment. freely en-
tered upon. to family, 
friendship. trust, and 
work obligations. Con-
cern that laws and 
duties be based on 
rational calculation of 
overall utility. -the 
greatest good for the 
greatest number.• 
The belief as a rational 
person in the validity 
of universal moral prin• 
ciples. and a sense of 





societal point of 
view from inter-
personal agreement 
or motives. Takes 
the point of view 
of the system that 
defines roles and 
rules . Considers 
individual rela-
tions in terms of 






aware of values and 
rights prior to so-
cial attachments 
13 
and contracts • . In-
tegrates perspec-




ity. and due pro-
cess. Considers 
moral and le01l 
points of view; rec-
ognizes that they 
sometimes conflict 
and finds it diffi-
cult to integrate 
them. 
Perspective of a 
moral point of view 
from which social 
arrangeme~ts derive. 
Perspective is that 
of any rational in-
dividual recognizing 
the nature of moral-
ity or the fact that 
persons are ends in 
themselves and must 
be treated as such. 
From ~ral Develooment and Behavior: Theor Research and Social Issues (pp. 34-35) 
by Thomas L1ckon1 td •• 9 6. hew York: Hot. 1nehart and Winston. 
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To assess moral development level Kohlberg employs a 
semi-structured interview. The predominant stage 
orientation of a subject is assessed by analyzing his/her 
responses to several moral dilemmas. These are scored 
with respect to issues such as "considering the value of 
life in judging actions" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 45). The 
number of issues and specific details of the scoring 
system have been modified several times by Kohlberg. As 
the scoring system has been modified, average stage 
profiles have changed. In Kohlberg's earlier scoring 
systems, stage scores for a subject were very mixed. 
Profiles of stage usage indicated that, on the average, 
50% of an individual's moral judgment fit~ . single stage 
(Kohlberg, 1969). Stage mixture of more than two stages 
was the rule. The new scoring system produces less stage 
mixture with a subject's predominant stage accounting for 
about 67% of the total scores assigned (Colby, et al, 
1983). 
Kurtines and Gewirtz (1984) assert that in line with 
the assumption of "a structured whole," one would expect 
to find a high degree of internal consistency. They 
report that their data support this assumption. Their 
analysis of stage distributions showed that most 
interviews scored at either a single stage or at two 
adjacent stages. 
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Kohlberg's later scoring system takes into account 
what he defines as A and B substage distinctions. He 
states that this distinction is helpful in any attempts to 
relate moral judgment to moral action. Subjects "using 
B-substage reasoning would be more likely to engage in the 
moral action they believed to be just, than would users of 
A-substage reasoning" (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 44). 
Kohlberg explains the B substage as corresponding "to 
Piaget's notion of an orientation of autonomy, mutual 
respect, and reversibility, in contrast to the heteronomy 
of the A substage" (1983, p. 7). In addition to the 
Piagetian criteria, Kohlberg assigns to the B substages an 
"intuition" of a hierarchy of values; such as, of life 
over property and of promise or contract over authority. 
B-substage reasoning involves an intuition of a hierarchy 
that is only given a logical justice rationale at 
principled stages of justice reasoning. 
Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning have been the 
center of considerable controversy. Several experimental 
studies (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Prentice, 1972; 
Plummer, 1983; Lawson, 1986) have argued that moral 
judgments are directly affected by social influence. 
These studies conclude that it is possible to induce 
changes in moral judgments that run counter to cognitive-
developmental predictions. 
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Some of the controversy has arisen from concerns 
about the universality of the stages (Gibbs, 1977; 
Simpson, 1974). There has been considerable disagreement 
about the question of gender differences in moral 
reasoning. In early research Kohlberg (1969) and other 
researchers using his model found that most men reach 
stage 4, while most women remain at stage 3. Carol 
Gilligan (1982) has recently taken issue with this claim, 
proposing that women do follow a different developmental 
path and that Kohlberg's scoring scheme is biased in favor 
of men. Gilligan's work on gender differences has been 
criticized as a plan of study rather than an empirical 
work completed (Greeno & Maccoby, 1986). Walker (1984), 
in an extensive review of the empirical literature, 
concludes that gender differences in moral reasoning are 
rarely found, and when they are found, they are explained 
by the male subjects having a higher average education 
level than the female subjects. 
Turiel examined the question of Kohlberg's stages 
forming an invariant sequence by testing the implication 
that movement should be from one stage to that stage 
directly above. Turiel hypothesized that if the sequence 
of stages is invariant, subjects exposed to moral 
reasoning directly above their dominant stage would be 
influenced more than those exposed to stages further above 
their own. He also hypothesized that if acquisition of 
each stage is a reorganization of the preceding stages, 
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and not simply an addition to them, then subjects would 
resist lower stage reasoning. It was expected, then, that 
subjects exposed to moral reasoning one stage above would 
be influenced more than subjects exposed either to one 
stage below or more than one above. Both hypotheses were 
confirmed by his findings (Turiel, 1966). 
Even though Turiel's purpose was to test the 
invariant sequencing of moral stages, his design indicated 
that he expected certain situational elements to influence 
moral reasoning. His results suggested that moral 
reasoning provided by others did influence the moral 
judgments of his subjects. 
In a 1969 study, Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg attempted 
to replicate Turiel's findings and, at the same t ,ime, 
isolate some of the developmental factors that might 
explain Turiel's results. They tested subjects' 
preference for and comprehension of moral judgments made 
by others. Results indicated that subjects prefer moral 
concepts that are above their predominant stage of moral 
reasoning whether that preferred reasoning is one or two 
stages higher. Individuals preferred the highest level 
which they could comprehend, rather than their own level 
or the one directly above. 
Kohlberg (1969) would explain this as an alternate 
"Platonic level" notion. "An individual's aesthetic 
productions may be at the level of 'Chopsticks' on the 
piano, ... Yet, his comprehension ... may be at the level 
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of Bach" (Rest, et al., 1969, p. 242). The view is termed 
"Platonic" because it assumes that developmental order 
exists in passive intuition, as well as in the active 
reorganization of cognitive structures. 
It is also Platonic in supposing that there may be a 
latent higher-level structure in the individual who will 
display it under certain eliciting conditions of partial 
exposure to it. Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) conclude 
that "it is clear that in most areas of thought, the 
ability to appreciate and comprehend higher-level material 
outstrips the ability to function spontaneously at that 
level" (p. 247). Like the Turiel (1966) study, the 
results of their investigation also suggested that 
exposure to the m~ral reasoning of others influenced moral 
choices. The exposure comprised the eliciting conditions. 
Rest's Complex Stage Model of Moral Reasoning 
Since its appearance in 1958, Kohlberg's paradigm has 
generated a great deal of research. Among the more 
prolific researchers is a former colleague and co-author 
of Kohlberg's, James Rest. Rest (1979) reviewed what he 
considered to be four kinds of empirical discrepancies 
present in Kohlberg's simple stage model. These 
discrepancies included: 
1. Subject fluctuation. Moral judgment research 
provides much evidence of subject fluctuation (Selman & 
' 
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Liebermann, 1975; Kuhn, 1976). According to Rest (1979a) 
acquisition is not an all-or-none matter, "but seems 
rather to increase in degree of probability that the 
structure will be in evidence" (p. 54). 
2. Inconsistencies due to test characteristics. 
Using the Kohlberg paradigm, some researchers have 
demonstrated differential "story pull" of the dilemmas in 
the Kohlberg test. Test characteristics make a 
significant difference in the manifestation of cognitive 
structure. 
3. Lack of decalage across content domains. 
Subjects do not demonstrate the same level of moral 
reasoning in all situations. Evidence for synchrony 
across story lines is ambiguous. Kohlberg's research 
allows that subjects demonstrate a mix of stage scores 
across moral dilemmas. 
4. Discrepancies due to response mode. In the 
interview method a subject is credited with possessing a 
cognitive structure only if he/she can explain it. 
Piagetian researchers who use non-verbal methods of 
assessment often report earlier ages of acquisition of 
cognitive structures. Capacity for verbal expression may 
be a confounding variable in the assessment of moral 
reasoning. 
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Rest agrees with Kohlberg that qualitatively 
different forms of moral judgment can be identified and 
that development involves the increasing use of more 
sophisticated types of reasoning. He disagrees, however, 
with the claim that development proceeds through a 
stepwise sequence of internally consistent stages. Rest 
avers instead that individuals simultaneously use 
reasoning of many types and that an adequate description 
of an individual's moral reasoning development must 
include a quantitative account of the proportion of each 
type of reasoning rather than a global stage designation 
for the individual. 
Figure 1 is Rest's graphic presentation of the simple 
stage model representing Kohlberg's major theoretical 
tenets regarding moral development. Each stage peaks at 
100% usage with the only stage mixture being what occurs 
between adjacent stages. Stages are evenly spaced across 
development. 
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Fic....:.:-e 1. Graphic presentation of the simple stage 
rnocel. 
Note. From Develc:::ment in Ju~cina Moral Issues (p. 52) 
:,y :.R. Rest, 2.979, !-~i.nneapol:..s: universi-:y of 
Minnesota Press. 
Rest (1973) tested empirically the hierarc t ical 
nature of moral judgment by studying pat~erns of 
comprehension and preference of moral stages. Rest 
pointed out that studies of moral judgment usually assume 
that a su b ject's moral judgments are produced at the 
highest stages/he is capable of; :tis also assumed that 
when a subject later produces moral judgments at a higher 
stage, the change represents the acquisition of new 
capacities. He argued that a subject might not produce 
moral judgments at the highest stage of which s/he is 
capable, and that changes in judgments over time might 
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represent shifts in preferences for certain kinds of moral 
judgments. Rest states that "no pure, direct assessment 
of cognitive structure exists that is unaffected by the 
specific task, content, and response characteristics of 
the situation" (p. 64). His complex stage model adapts 
Kohlberg's structural theory to take into account "the 
situational aspects along with the structural capacities 
of the reasoner" (Plummer, 1983, p. 17). 
Figure 2 illustrates Rest's extension of structural 
theory to account for the different types of responses 
expected as a function of the relative usage of six 
different stages across development. Subjects begin by 
using a type of reasoning only in certain instances and 
move towards solidifying that reasoning and applying it to 
a wider variety of situations. Rest's complex stage model 
refers to development as the increasing probability of 
using higher stages of reasoning (Plummer, 1983). 
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Development --1~► 
Fiaure 2. The complex stage model. A disjunctive scale 
formed by the relative usage of six different stages 
across development. 
Note. From Devel~oment in Judaina Moral Issues (p. 224) 
by J .R. Rest, 1969, ~.inneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Development, as described by Rest's complex stage 
model, is sequential as well as hierarchical wherein 
development is described as a continuous rather than a 
discrete process. Within this model a subject is 
hypothesized to exhibit a developmental profile rather 
than unitary stage behavior. 
In the "Foreward" to Rest's Development in Judging 
Moral Issues, Kohlberg states that Rest's early 
"questioning of the simple stage model was entirely in 
line with empirical findings at that time" (Rest, 1979a, 
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p. XIV). Such questioning led Rest to develop the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT), a recognition test of moral 
development. Rest (1979) asserts in his "Preface" that 
"alternative schemes for assessing moral judgment became a 
compelling interest to me" (p.xviii) and ultimately he 
devised a multiple-choice questionnaire. 
While Rest allows that reasoners utilize a full range 
of stage responses to address each moral situation, he 
considers the amount of principled reasoning an individual 
uses as the index of the maturity of his/her moral 
reasoning. One of the indices provided by the DIT is the 
P-index, i.e., the relative importance given to Stages 5 
and 6, principled thinking. Rest cites studies which 
compared the validity and reliability of indices in the 
DIT and insists on the superiority of the P-index as a 
measure of moral reasoning maturity (Rest, 1979b). 
The P-index of the DIT reflects an individual's 
preference for principred moral reasoning. It combines 
issue choices from Stages Sa, Sb and 6. Unlike a unitary 
stage score, it represents a combined reasoning and 
demonstrates more sensitivity to change. 
Rotter's Locus of Control Theory 
It was in the context of social learning theory that 
the concept of locus of control emerged. Attempting to 
integrate reinforcement theories and cognitive field 
theories, Rotter stressed that human behavior is so 
complex that it cannot be explained through single 
concepts (Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972). Rather, 
behavior is determined both by the structure of the 
situation and by the beliefs or expectancies brought to 
the situation by the person. 
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Expectancy is defined as the probability held by the 
individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as a 
function of a specific behavior on his/her part in a 
specific situation or situations. It is the emphasis 
placed on the expectancy construct that sets Rotter's 
theory apart (Rotter, 1975). While Rotter makes it clear 
that perceived degree of control may certainly vary in an 
individual as a function of both specific situation and 
the value of specific reinforcements for that individual, 
as a personality variable he views it as a generalized 
expectancy built up across many life situations, the sum 
total of which is a general expectation regarding the 
degree of personal control in the future. 
In his original monograph Rotter (1966) explained 
that: 
When a reinforcement is perceived by the 
subject as following some action of his own 
but not being entirely contingent upon his 
action, then, in our culture, it is 
typically perceived as the result of luck, 
chance, fate, as under the control of 
powerful others, or as unpredictable 
because of the great complexity of forces 
surrounding him. When the event is 
interpreted in this way by an individual, 
we have labeled this a belief in external 





'ntingent upon his own behavior 
~atively permanent 
cs, we have termed this a 
~ernal control (p. 1). 
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Lefcourt (1982) insists that the locus of control 
construct should not be expected to account for "the 
lion's share" of the variance in most situations. 
Perception of control is a single expectancy construct. 
"People are not totally internals or externals ... the 
terms internal and external control depict an individual's 
more common tendencies to expect events to be contingent 
or noncontingent upon their actions" (p. 186). 
Studies of locus of control have investigated its 
relationship to numerous variables, such as achievement 
(Bar-Tal & Bar-Zahar, 1977), and psychopathology (Frank, 
1976). Several studies have examined the relationship of 
locus of control to resistance to influence (Getter, 1966; 
Cravens & Worchel, 1977) while a few others have looked at 
the issue of locus of control and moral responsibility 
(Karabenick & Srull, 1978; Midlarski, 1971). 
In his review of the research of locus of control, 
Lefcourt proposes that "maintenance of an internal control 
orientation is a bulwark against unquestioning submission 
to authority" (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 40). Conformity and 
compliance research is relatively consistent in indicating 
that persons with an internal locus of control withstand 
pressures to behave or to respond in prescribed manners. 
The findings of Getter (1966) and Strickland (1962, 1970) 
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indicate that Internals resist attempts of both covert and 
subtle influence. Similar findings have been reported by 
Jolley and Spielberger (1973) and Algre and Murray (1974). 
Situational variables suggest that Internals are 
discriminating and not just stubborn. Persons who view 
themselves as responsible for their own fates might be 
more cautious about what they accept from others than 
would those who do not perceive themselves to be in active 
control of the outcome of their efforts. In several 
studies (Ritchie & Phares, 1969; Mausner & Platt, 1971; 
McGinnies & Ward, 1974), Internals discriminated between 
the prestige of the messenger and the importance of the 
message. When the message was convincing, as in that 
concerning the link between smoking and illness, Internals 
were less resistant and were influenced to change their 
smoking behavior (Platt, 1969). Externals, on the other 
hand, were more conforming to the opinions of others when 
the other person was of a higher status, regardless of 
whether that person's expertise was relevant or not to the 
issues being discussed (Ryckman, Rodda & Sherman, 1972). 
Other studies (Biondo & MacDonald, 1971; Doctor, 1971) 
further demonstrate the resistance of Internals, 
particularly under overt influence conditions. Regardless 
of the style of influence, Externals appear to be more 
compliant than Internals (Cravens & Worchel, 1977). 
A few investigations have looked at the issue of 
moral responsibility and locus of control. Studies by 
R. C. Johnson, Ackerman, Frank and Fionda (1968) and by 
C. D. Johnson and Gormly (1972) provide support for the 
link between locus of control and resistance to 
temptation. 
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Some investigators have attempted to explore the 
relationship between locus of control and moral judgment 
maturity. (Alker & Peppin, 1973; Bloomberg, 1974; 
Connolly & McCarrey, 1978). Though the evidence is in 
some ways conflicting, persons classified as internal have 
been found to score higher on assessments or moral 
judgment maturity (Lefcourt, 1978). 
This study is . an extension of the Turiel 
investigation and that of Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg. 
While those studies explored changes in moral reasoning in 
general, the present study looks at certain factors that 
influence those changes. It will investigate the 
relationship of an individual's locus of control to 
changes in moral reasoning. 
A first hypothesis is that movement in moral 
reasoning is toward higher levels of reasoning. It is 
predicted that those exposed to moral reasoning above 
their own will change more than those exposed to lower 
levels of reasoning. 
A second hypothesis is that a person's locus of 
control relates to that person's resistance to change 
moral reasoning in a situation where pressure to change 
that reasoning is exerted. It is predicted that if 
presented with moral reasoning that is above their own, 
subjects with an internal locus of control are not as 







All subjects included in this study came from a 
sample of college undergraduate volunteers. These 
volunteers were solicited from introductory psychology 
classes at a large community college in New England. The 
college population derives largely from the working class 
with the second largest number coming from the lower 
middle class population. Requisition for volunteers 
stated that the age range include 18-32 and that only 
students with English as their first language could 
participate. 
From an original large sample of 171 subjects who 
were administered the screening instruments, the final 
subsample of 88 were selected according to criteria 
outlined for participation in the research design. This 
final group included 24 males and 64 females (Age range 
18-32, Mdn = 19). Other demographic information requested 
was incomplete. 
This study was reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Rhode 
Island (See Appendix A). Subjects were required to sign 
an informed consent form (See Appendix B) and were 
debriefed at the conclusion of the project. 
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Instruments 
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The Defining Issues 
Test, designed by Rest (1979b) (See Appendix C) consists 
of six moral dilemma situations. In responding to the 
DIT, subjects are first required to decide the course of 
action to be followed in resolving the moral dilemma. 
Following each dilemma are twelve statements which 
characterize various issues or questions that might affect 
the decision about the dilemma. These twelve issues 
reflect reasoning at Kohlberg's moral development stages 
2, 3, 4, Sa, Sb and 6. Respondents rate each of the 
twelve statements from "Great Importance" to "No 
Importance." Finally, respondents identify and rank the 
four most important issues concerning the dilemma. 
Each of the four issues identified and ranked in 
importance in respect to the resolution of the dilemma is 
weighted as follows: first choice, 4 points; second 
choice, 3 points; third choice, 2 points; fourth choice, 1 
point. The subject's P-score is derived by summing the 
weighted scores for issue choices within stages Sa, Sb and 
6. The P-score represents the magnitude of a respondent's 
preference for principled moral issues (Stages Sa, Sb and 
6) in deciding the course of action to be followed in a 
moral dilemma. The %Pis the subject's actual P-score 
divided by the total number of possible points on the 
entire test. The score can range from Oto 95. 
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The D-score is an overall index of moral judgment 
which uses information from all stages rather than from 
only Stages 5 and 6. It is a composite score in which the 
score is higher to the extent that the subject gives high 
ratings to high stage items, and the score is lower to the 
extent that the subject gives high ratings to low stage 
items. Whereas P reflects the level of a subject's 
principled reasoning, D reflects his/her relative 
preference for principled reasoning over conventional and 
preconventional reasoning. Unlike the P-score, which is 
based on the rankings of the four items ranked in order of 
importance, the D-score is based on ratings of al ~ of the 
test items ("Great Importance" to "No Importance"). 
Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz and Anderson (1974) 
report a test-retest correlation of .81 (N = 28, 
test-retest interval not reported). Carey (1985) reports 
a test-retest correlation of .72 (N = 77, test-retest 
interval 5 weeks). Bode and Page (1978) obtained an 
internal consistency estimate for the DIT, as measured by 
Cronbach's alpha of .74 for the P-score. Correlation of 
the DIT with Kohlberg's Moral Development Interview is 
reported at .68 (Rest et al., 1974). 
To contribute to the criterion group validity of the 
DIT, Rest (1976) collected data from 50 studies on 5,714 
subjects in 136 different samples. These data suggest 
that subjects with differing educational levels show 
significant discriminant DIT scores. Rest contends that 
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subjects' DIT scores should be positively correlated with 
educational level since both indices tap cognitive 
development in general. If subjects at different 
educational levels evidence differential DIT performance, 
evidence for criterion group validity is provided. His 
student groups - junior high(~= 1,322), senior high 
(~ = 581), college (~ = 2,479), graduate (~ = 183) -
averaged progressive P-scores of 21.9, 31.8, 42.3 and 53.3 
respectively. 
Evidence for convergent-divergent validity of the DIT 
is provided by Rest (1979b) in his summary of data from 
several studies which correlated the DIT with performance 
on Kohlbergian tests or moral judgment. Rest reports 
correlations ranging from .68 - .78 (N = 41 - 213). 
The Rotter Scale. The Rotter Internal-External Locus 
of Control (LOC) Scale (Rotter, 1966) is a twenty-three 
item forced choice questionnaire with six filler items 
adopted from the sixty item James Scale (Lefcourt, 1981). 
It is scored in the external direction; that is, the 
higher the score, the more external the individual. Each 
item consists of a pair of alternatives. Subjects are 
asked to select the one statement of each pair which they 
more strongly believe to be more true. Each pair of 
alternatives offers a choice that reflects a fatalistic, 
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external control viewpoint and a choice reflecting a 
belief in one's own ability to affect and to be in control 
of the events in one's life. (See Appendix D). 
Rotter (1966) reports test-retest correlations 
ranging from .49 - .83 (test-retest interval 1-2 months 
and N = 30 - 177). Internal consistency estimates of the 
Rotter Internal-External Scale, as measured by the 
Kuder-Richardson reliability coefficient, range from 
.69 - .79. A Spearman-Brown coefficient of .79 was 
reported (Rotter, 1966). 
Procedure 
The Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979) and the Rotter 
Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966) 
were administered to the original large sample during 
class time. Class groups ranged in size from 18-28 and 
met on two different days. Before the instruments were 
administered, students were told that the questionnaires 
were part of a research project. The examiner emphasized 
that participation was voluntary, that their test results 
would be anonymous and that participation or non-partici-
pation would in no way affect their grade. It was 
explained that the research would comprise two parts and 
some of them would be asked to participate in the second 
part. Only three students elected not to participate. 
Standard directions to the Rotter Locus of Control 
Scale were distributed and read (See Appendix D) to each 
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class. When all subjects had completed that scale, the 
DIT was distributed and standard directions for that test 
were read. (See Appendix C). 
Both instruments were scored by computer with later 
random selection for handscoring. To insure anonymity 
each subject received a coded number. From the initial 
sample, a subsample was selected for assignment to eight 
experiment~! groups. Selection and assignment of subjects 
were determined by their scores on the Defining Issues 
Test and on the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control 
Scale. 
Subjects were classified as Internal or External by 
splitting the sample at the median of their scores on the 
Rotter Scale (Mdn. = 10; SD= 3.36). 
Subjects were paired according to their locus of 
control classification and by their moral reasoning 
P-score. 
In Group A, each pair had one Internal and one 
External subject (Different LOC) with the Internal having 
the higher P-score. Group B had pairs where the External 
subject had the higher P-score (Different LOC). Groups C 
and D matched an External with an External in the first 
(Same LOC) and an Internal with an - Internal in the second 
(Same LOC). P-scores were used to form the four groups 
according to the recommended four quartile cut-offs (Rest, 
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1979b). Each pair of subjects had individuals who scored 
either in the first and third quartiles or in the second 
and fourth quartiles. 
To control for the factor of sex, males were paired 
with males and females with females. To avoid any 
confounding of data from the factor of age, subjects were 
matched within four years of each other's age. 
These procedures produced four groups of pairs, which 
could then be further divided by splitting the pairs, 
resulting in eight distinct groups of subjects as follows: 
HID: high scoring Internal paired with low scoring 
External ( 3 males, 8 females). 
HED: high scoring External paired with low scoring 
Internal ( 1 male, 10 females). 
HIS: high scoring Internal paired with low scoring 
Internal ( 4 males, 7 females). 
HES: high scoring External paired with low scoring 
External ( 4 males, 7 females). 
LID: low scoring Internal paired with high scoring 
External ( 1 male, 10 females). 
LED: low scoring External paired with high scoring 
Internal ( 3 males, 8 females). 
LIS: low scoring Internal paired with high scoring 
Internal ( 4 males, 7 females). 
LES: low scoring External paired with high scoring 
External ( 4 males, 7 females). 
Several internal checks on subject reliability 
eliminated some subjects from the original sample from 
participating in the final subsample. One check was the 
"M" score on their DIT protocols. 
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M items were written to sound pretentious but not to 
mean anything relative to the dilemma. These statements, 
according to Rest, "do not represent any stage of thinking 
but rather represent a subject's tendency to endorse 
statements for their pretentiousness rather than their 
meaning" (Rest, 1979, p. 3.3). Test instructions 
cautioned the subject about rating and ranking items that 
sound like "gibberish" as having "no importance." 
Subjects' protocols with M scores of 8 or more were 
eliminated(~= 2). 
The consistency check compared the subject's ratings 
of issue statements with the subject's rankings of item 
importance. If a subject ranked an item first, then no 
other item should have a higher rating. If a subject had 
inconsistencies on more than 2 stories, that subject's 
protocol was eliminated(~= 49). 
A third consistency check involved eliminating 
subjects who showed little discrimination in ratings. If 
two stories had more than 9 items rated the same, the 
protocol was discarded(~= 14). 
Some subjects were lost because of their absence or 
the absence of their partners on the day the consensus 
situation was scheduled (N = 18). 
38 
The second session was scheduled for four weeks after 
the first administration of the two instruments. At the 
class period before the scheduled date, those students who 
were to participate in the second testing were informed of 
their selection; other students were given a take-home 
assignment for that class period. At the second meeting 
two classes had six pairs of students, while four classes 
had eight pairs of students. Subjects in the subsample 
received their original Defining Issues Test. At this 
session they were asked to sign the informed consent form 
which stated that they agreed to discuss their answers 
with one other person and to come to agreement with that 
person on the questions concerning the six dilemmas in the 
DIT. 
The paired subjects were instructed that in this 
session they were to discuss their original responses on 
the test and that they had to come to a mutual agreement 
on their choices for completing the DIT. They were 
advised that they should discuss each issue and come to a 
shared decision. Discussion and agreement produced a 
consensus score whereby each pair then submitted one 
answer for each item. These were scored for the consensus 
or post-test scores for each subject. 
Subjects involved in the original sample and in the 
final subsample were debriefed after the second session 




The research procedures produced four groups of pairs 
which could be further divided by splitting the pairs, 
resulting in eight distinct groups of subjects. For each 
subject in each group an independently obtained P-score 
and D-score (Pre-test) and a consensus P-score and D-score 
(Post-test) were obtained. First, the significance of 
P-score and D-score change was evaluated for each group. 
Then P-score and D-score changes, obtained by subtracting 
Pre-test scores from Post-test scores, were used to 
compare relative changes among the groups. The results of 
these analyses follow. 
Analysis of P-scores 
P-scores were calculated according to standardized 
DIT scoring instructions. Table 2 contains the means and 
standard deviations of original (Pre-test) scores and of 
consensus (Post-test) scores for individuals in each of 
the eight groups. To determine which groups changed 
significantly, !-tests, using Sandler's ~-statistic, were 
performed on each group's pre-and post-test scores (Runyon 
& Haber, 1980). Because of multiple comparisons an alpha 
level of .01 was used. All comparisons were significant 
at this level, £<.01 (See Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-test and Post-test 
P-scores and the A-statistic for Groups with 2 levels of 
Locus of Control,-2 levels of Moral Reasoning and 2 levels 












45.45 5.75 37.09 
17.27 7.26 26.09 
41.90 7.90 26.09 









44.54 9.46 37.00 12.74 0.161** 
22.27 8.77 37.00 12.74 0.122*** 
45.72 7.54 38.54 8.10 0.131*** 
22.81 8.77 38.54 8.10 0.107*** 
Sandler's A statistic 
** .E < .01 
.E < .001 *** 
Note: Experimenterwise error rate= .07 
Each group changed significantly. Some of the groups 
changed positively and some changed negatively. Both 
groups of higher reasoning Internals, as well as both 
groups of higher reasoning Externals moved in a negative 
direction. All lower reasoning groups, two of Internal 
locus of control and two of External locus of control, 
changed in a positive direction. Therefore, one can 
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45.45 5.75 37.09 10.92 0.169** 
17.27 7.26 26.09 9.95 0.182** 
41.90 7.90 26.09 9.95 0.108*** 
22.27 9.03 37.09 10.92 0.135** 
44.54 9.46 37.00 12.74 0.161** 
22.27 8.77 37.00 12.74 0.122*** 
45.72 7.54 38.54 8.10 0.131*** 
22.81 8.77 38.54 8.10 0.107*** 
Sandler's A statistic 
** £ < • 01 
£ < .001 *** 
Note: Experimenterwise error rate= .07 
Each group changed significantly. Some of the groups 
changed positively and some changed negatively. Both 
groups of higher reasoning Internals, as well as both 
groups of higher reasoning Externals moved in a negative 
direction. All lower reasoning groups, two of Internal 
locus of control and two of External locus of control, 
changed in a positive direction. Therefore, one can 
conclude that higher moral reasoners moved downward 
significantly, while lower moral reasoners moved upward 
significantly. 
Analysis of P-Score Changes 
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P-score changes were obtained on each individual by 
subtracting the P-score originally obtained by the subject 
working independently (Pre-test) from the consensus 
P-score (Post-test). Table 3 contains the means and 
standard deviations of change scores for individuals in 
each of the eight groups, separated by locus of control, 
level of moral reasoning and nature of pairing (Same/ 
Different). 
Table 3 
Means and Standard . Deviations of P-Score Changes for 
Groups with 2 Levels of Locus of Control, 2 Levels of 
Moral Reasoning and 2 Levels of Pairing (N = 11 per 
group). -
Paired with Paired with 
Same Locus of Control Different Locus of Control 
Moral Reasoning Moral Reasoning 
Higher of Lower of Higher of Lower of 
Pair Pair Pair Pair 
M -7.55 14.73 -8.36 8.82 
Internals 
SD 6.98 9.14 8.14 9.27 
M -7.18 . 15.73 -15.82 14.82 
Externals 
SD 5.02 7.04 8.48 10.55 
Hartley's f-maximum test was not significant, 
F (10, 8) = 4.65, E>.05, indicating that the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance among the groups was not 
violated. 
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To determine significant changes in moral reasoning a 
2x2x2 factorial analysis of variance (Winer, 1971) was 
performed on the P-score changes with two levels each of 
moral reasoning (High, Low) of locus of control (Internal, 
External) and of type of pairing (SameLOC, DiffLOC). 
Table 4 presents a summary of the results obtained in the 
ANOVA. 
Table 4 
Summary of 2x2x2 ANOVA of P-Score Changes for 8 Groups 
with 2 Levels of Locus of Control, 2 Levels of Moral 
Reasoning and 2 Levels of Pairing(~= 11 per group). 
Source ss. df ms F 
Reason 11892.375 1 11892.375 173.416*** 
Locus 0.011 1 0.011 .001 
Same/Di ff. 364.102 1 364.102 5.309* 
Reason X Locus 273.011 1 273.011 3.981* 
Reason X Same/Diff. 9.557 1 9.557 0.139 
Locus X Same/Diff. 10.920 1 10.920 0.159 
ReasonXLocusXSame/Diff. 225.920 1 225.920 3.294 
Error 5486.182 80 68.577 
Total 18262.080 87 209.909 
* E < .05 
*** E < .001 
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The main effect for reasoning level, f (1, 80) • 
173.416, £ < .001, indicates a significant difference in 
P-score changes between low reasoners (M = 13.52) and high 
reasoners (M = -9.73). These results support the first 
hypothesis. The main effect for Same/Difference of 
pairing was also significant, f (1, 80) = 5.309, £ < .02, 
indicating that being paired with a person of same or 
different locus of control differentially affected changes 
in the P-score. Change scores for subjects paired with 
other subjects with similar locus of control (M • 3.93) 
differed significantly from change scores of subjects 
paired with persons of a different locus of control 
(M • -0.14). The main effect of locus of control was not 
significant. 
The interaction effect of ReasonXLocus of Control was 
also significant, f (1, 80) = 3.981, £ < .049, indicating 
differential changes for different combinations of 
reasoning level and locus of control. 
A Newman-Keuls (Howell, 1987) procedure for multiple 
comparisons applied to the ordered means (See Table 5) 
revealed that: 
1. there was a significant difference between higher 
reasoning Externals and lower reasoning Internals with 
lower reasoning Internals (M = 11.77) changing in an 
upward direction and higher reasoning Externals 
(M = -11.50) changing downward. 
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2. there was a significant difference between higher 
reasoning Externals and lower reasoning Externals. Lower 
reasoners (M = 15.27) changed upwards while higher 
reasoners (M • -11.50) moved down. 
3. there was a significant difference between higher 
reasoning Internals and lower reasoning Internals where 
lower reasoners (M = 11.77) changed upwards and higher 
reasoners (M • -7.95) changed downwards. 
4. there was a significant difference between higher 
reasoning Internals and lower reasoning Externals. Lower 
reasoning Externals (M = 15.27) changed up while higher 
reasoning Internals (M = -7.95) moved down. 
5. there was no significant difference between 
higher reasoning Externals and higher reasoning Internals. 
6. there was no significant difference between lower 
reasoning Internals and lower reasoning Externals. 
Table 5 
Newman-Keuls Multiple Comparisons for 2-way Reason by 
Locus Interaction: Difference Between Ordered Means 
( 1 ) HiE ( 2 ) Hi! ( 3 ) Lo! ( 4 ) LOE 
Mean -11.50 -7.95 11.77 15.27 
-11.50 3.55 23.27* 26.77* 
- 7.95 19.72* 23.22* 
11.77 3.50 
* £ < .OS 
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Figure 3. A graphic presentation of the mo-w;r; interaction effect of 
Reason X Locus of Control 
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The 3-way interaction of ReasonXLocusXSame/Different 
was not statistically significant. However, for 
exploratory purposes, follow-up tests were applied to see 
if comparison of any particular pairs of groups revealed 
statistical significance. 
The Duncan Multiple Range procedure for multiple 
comparisons applied to the 3-way interaction, that is, to 
the eight individual cell means, (See Table 6) revealed 
that: 
1. lower reasoning Externals paired with a similar 
locus of control (LES) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Externals regardless of the pairing (HES, HED) 
(£ < .05). 
2. lower reasoning Externals paired with a similar 
locus of control (LES) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Internals regardless of the pairing (HIS, HID) 
(£ <.05). 
3. lower reasoning Externals paired with different 
locus of control (LED) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Externals regardless of the pairing (HES, HED) 
(_e<. 05). 
4. lower reasoning Externals paired with different 
locus of control (LED) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Internals regardless of the pairing (HIS, HID) 
(_e < .05). 
5. lower reasoning Internals paired with other 
Internals (LIS) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Internals regardless of the pairing (HIS, HID) 
(£.< .05). 
6. lower reasoning Internals paired with other 
Internals (LIS) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Externals regardless of the pairing (HES, HED) 
<.e.< .05). 
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7. lower reasoning Internals paired with different 
locus of control (LID) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Internals regardless of the pairing (HIS, HID) 
(£. < .05). 
8. lower reasoning Internals paired with different 
locus of control (LID) differed significantly from higher 
reasoning Externals regardless of the pairing (HES, HED) 
(.E_ < .OS). 
9. higher reasoning Externals paired with lower 
reasoning Internals (HED) differed significantly from 
higher reasoning Internals paired with lower reasoning 
Externals (HID) (£. < .05). 
10. higher reasoning Externals paired with lower 
reasoning Internals (HED) differed significantly from 
higher reasoning Internals paired with lower reasoning 
Internals (HIS) (.E_ < .OS). 
11. higher reasoning Externals paired with lower 
reasoning Internals (HED) differed significantly from 
higher reasoning Externals paired with lower reasoning 
Externals (HES) (£ < .05) 
Table 6 
Duncan's New Multiple Range Test of Multiple Comparisons 
for 3-Way Interaction: Difference Between Ordered Means 
LES LED LIS LID HES HIS HID HED 
Means 15.73 14.82 14.73 8.82 -7.18 -7.55 -8.36 -15.82 
LES .91 1.00 6.91 22.91• 23.28• 24.33* 31.SS• 
LED .09 6.00 22.00• 22.37• 23.18* 30 ! 64* 
LIS 5.91 21.91* 22.28• 23.09* 30.55* 
LID 16.00• 16.37* 17.18* 24.64• 
HE_S .37 1.18 8.64* 
HIS .81 8.27* 
HID 7.46* 
*.2 < .OS 
These results are pictured graphically in Figure 4. 
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Overall, level of reasoning had the greatest impact 
on amount of change in that low reasoners of both Internal 
and External locus of control evinced the greatest amount 
of change. Being paired with a person of same or 
different locus of control differentially affected changes 
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Figure 4. A graphic presentation of the three-way interaction effect of 
Reason X Locus of Control X Same/Different 
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when that reasoner was a High External paired with an 
Internal. When that combination occurred, Externals 
changed significantly more. 
so 
The Omega-Squared procedure was applied to assess the 
magnitude of the experimental effect on P-score changes. 
For P-change a total of 68% of the variance was 
attributable to treatment effects. Specifically, 65% was 
attributable to the main effect of Reason; 2% was 
attributable to the main effect of Same/Different and 1% 
was attributable to the interaction effect of Reason by 
Locus of Control . The remaining 32% was attributable to 
error. 
Analysis of D-Scores 
D-scores were calculated according to standardized 
DIT scoring instructions. Table 7 contains the means and 
standard deviations of original (Pre-test) scores and of 
consensus (Post-test) scores for individuals in each of 
the eight groups . To determine which groups changed 
significantly, !-tests, using Sandler's ~-statistic, were 
performed on each group's pre and post-test scores (Runyon 
& Haber, 1980). Because of multiple comparisons an alpha 
level of .01 was used. (See Table 7). 
The four groups included in Different Pairing (HID, 
HED, LID, LED) changed significantly. In the groups of 
Same Pairing only the low internal group (LIS) changed 
significantly. 
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Some groups changed positively and some changed 
negatively. Both groups of higher reasoning Internals, as 
well as both groups of higher reasoning Externals moved in 
a negative direction. All lower reasoning groups, two of 
Internal locus of control and two of External locus of 
control, changed in a positive direction. 
Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-tests and Post-tests 
and the A-Statistic for Groups with 2 Levels of Locus of 
Control,-2 Levels of Moral Reasoning and 2 Levels of 
Pairing(~= 11 per group). , 
Group 
Different Pairing 
High Internal 26.09 
Low Internal 11. 72 
High External 22.09 
Low External 13.90 
Same Pairing 
High Internal 25.81 
Low Internal 16.72 
High External 23.63 
Low External 17.72 
~ Sandler's A-Statistic 
** £ < .01 



























Analysis of D-Score Changes 
D-score changes were obtained on each individual by 
subtracting the D-score originally obtained by the subject 
working independently (Pre-test) from the consensus 
D-score (Post-test). Table 8 contains the means and 
standard deviations of change scores for individuals in 
each of the eight groups, separated by locus of control, 
by level of moral reasoning and by type of pairing(~• 11 
per group). 
Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations of D-Score Changes for 
Individuals with 2 Levels of Locus of Control, 2 Levels of 
Moral Reasoning and 2 Levels of Pairing (N = 11 per 
group). 
Paired with 
Same Locus of Control 
Moral Reasoning 













Different Locus of Control 
Moral Reasoning 






Hartley's F-maximum test was performed to test the 
homogeneity of variance. The null hypothesis was not 
rejected, F (10, 8) = 1.47, £ > .05, indicating that 
variances were homogeneous. 
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To determine significant changes in moral reasoning a 
2x2x2 analysis of variance was performed on changes in the 
D-scores, with two levels each of locus of control, of 
moral reasoning and of type of pairing. Table 9 presents 
a summary of the results of the ANOVA. 
Table 9 
Summary of 2x2x2 ANOVA of D-Score Changes for 8 Groups with 
2 Levels of Locus of Control, 2 Levels of Moral Reasoning 
and 2 Levels of Pairing(~~ 11 per group). 
Source 55 df ms F 
Reason 1928.909 1 1928.909 68.511* 
Locus 10.227 1 10.227 0.363 
Same/Di ff. 24.045 1 24.045 0.854 
Reason X Locus 6.545 1 6.545 0.232 
Reason X Same/Diff. 80.182 1 80.182 2.848 
Locus X Same/Diff. 1.136 1 1.136 0.040 
ReasonXLocusXSame/Diff. 26.182 1 26.182 0.930 
Error 2252.364 80 28.155 
Total 4329.591 87 49.765 
* £ < .05 
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Only the main effect of reasoning level was 
significant,! (1, 80) = 68.511, E < .001, indicating that 
D-scores for low reasoners increased more than D-scores 
for high reasoners. All other main effects and 
interactions were not significant at the .05 level. 
The Omega-Squared procedure was applied to assess the 
magnitude of the experimental effect on D-change scores. 
For D-change 44% of the variance was attributable to 
the main effect of Reason and 56% of the variance was 




The purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between an individual's locus of control and 
changes in that person's moral reasoning in a situation 
where external pressure is present in an effort to 
influence that person to change his/her moral reasoning. 
Consistent with the theories of Kohlberg and Rest, the 
first hypothesis was that change in moral reasoning would 
be toward higher levels of reasoning. It was predicted 
that those exposed to moral reasoning above their own 
would change more than those exposed to lower levels of 
reasoning. 
The second hypothesis considered subjects' locus of 
control as an intervening variable in a person's 
resistance to change moral reasoning in a situation where 
pressure to change that reasoning is exerted. It was 
predicted that, if presented with moral reasoning that is 
above their own, subjects with an internal locus of 
control would not be as likely as externally controlled 
subjects to change in moral reasoning. 
Summary of Results: Hypothesis One 
The first hypothesis that those exposed to moral 
reasoning above their own level would change more than 
those exposed to lower levels of reasoning and that the 
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greater change would be towards higher levels of reasoning 
was supported by the results of the study. The main 
effect of level of moral reasoning indicated a significant 
difference between low reasoners and high reasoners in 
both P-score changes and D-score changes. Regardless of 
the subjects' locus of control low reasoners were affected 
dramatically and their movement upward was statistically 
significantly different from changes in moral reasoning 
among the higher reasoners. 
Implications and Limitations. Support for this 
prediction is consistent with Kohlberg's theory. As 
stated earlier, Kohlberg's primary theoretical definition 
of structural moral development is that of an organism 
passing through invariant sequential stages (Kohlberg, 
1969). Over time subjects naturally tend to change upward 
(Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). 
The findings which support the first prediction are 
also consistent with Rest's theory of moral judgment 
development. While Rest (1979) challenges the notion of 
"step by step" development (p. 64), he supports the upward 
directional movement principle. In Rest's complex model a 
subject may advance in several organizations of thinking 
simultaneously and accept and endorse reasoning at several 
advanced levels of moral judgment. Subjects in this study 
who moved upward in moral reasoning scores did so in 
varying increments. 
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Confirmation of the first hypothesis is also 
commensurate with the findings of Turiel who set out "to 
subject Kohlberg's hypotheses to an experimental test" 
(Turiel, 1966, p. 612). In his experimental design all 
subjects of a given dominant stage were randomly assigned 
to a control group or to three experimental groups. In 
the three experimental treatments, subjects - in 
individual role-playing situations - were exposed to 
reasoning one stage above their initial dominant stage (+1 
treatment), to one stage below (-1 treatment), or to 
reasoning two stages above (+2 treatment). As 
hypothesized, the influence of the +1 treatment was 
significantly greater than that of the other two 
treatments. In the Turiel study there was some downward 
movement in some subjects. In the present study also 
there was some downward movement, but the greater movement 
was toward higher levels of reasoning. Both this study 
and the Turiel research support the theory that movement 
is directional toward higher levels of reasoning. 
However, both studies reveal that certain social 
interactions relative to moral reasoning may affect some 
downward changes in moral choices. 
Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1968) attempted to 
replicate the Turiel findings. In addition to assessing 
subjects' preference for higher moral reasoning, the study 
investigated subjects' comprehension, assimilation, and 
recapitulation of moral reasoning. In their study, 
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subjects' preference for higher moral reasoning was 
significant. Preference, assimilation, and recapitulation 
were all tied to comprehension. 
Movement upward in this experimental condition is 
consistent with Kohlberg's early formulation of his theory 
of moral development that offers a "horizontal" 
perspective of the logical, moral and social development 
of the individual. He depicts a parallel between Piaget's 
stages of cognitive development and the stages of moral 
development. While logical reasoning is a necessary 
condition for moral development, it is not a sufficient 
condition. Studies suggest that in the Kohlberg paradigm 
many are at a higher logical stage than moral, but 
essentially none are at a higher moral stage than their 
logical stage (Colby & Kohlberg, 1976). 
After development of logical stages comes development 
of what Kohlberg calls stages of social perception or 
role-taking. This he defines as the level at which one 
sees other people, interprets their thoughts and feelings 
and sees their role or place in society. Kohlberg 
declares that it is obvious that moral stages are 
primarily products of the child's interaction with others 
(Kohlberg, 1969). He is not suggesting that an individual 
simply "swallows" and assimilates values taught by 
another. Such moral values will be internalized when the 
individual can relate these values to a comprehended 
social order and to his/her own goals as a social self. 
The fundamental factor causing such a structuring of a 
moral order is the social participation and role-taking 
opportunity referred to earlier. In the present study 
subjects were exposed to the "role-taking" and reasoning 
of another individual and asked to "participate" in that 
role-taking and reasoning. 
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The evidence for stage mixture in subjects is clear 
(Kohlberg, 1969; Colby, 1979; Lawson, 1986) with usage 
distributed around the mode in decreasing fashion as one 
moves farther away from the modal stage. The Rest (1973) 
study demonstrated that "the increasing difficulty of the 
stages sets upper limits on what kinds of moral judgments 
are conceptually possible for a subject, and preference 
for greater structural adequacy sets lower limits on what 
kinds of moral judgments the subject would be satisfied 
with" (p. 105). Within the individual's cognitive 
structure there is room for movement in either direction, 
but that movement is limited. Of the 88 subjects in the 
present study 4 Internals who were in the high reasoning 
groups moved even higher than their original principled 
reasoning scores. Response variability lends further 
support to Rest's complex stage model as opposed to 
Kohlberg's "structured whole" theory (Rest, 1976; Plummer, 
1983). 
A question the present study did not address is how 
clear or comprehensible the higher reasoning subjects may 
have made their arguments in trying to persuade the lower 
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reasoners to accept their choices for moral issues. The 
general result was in the predicted direction, but the 
question could be asked if any downward movement was in 
part due to compromise because the lower reasoning partner 
could not comprehend the argument for higher choices. 
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) suggest that response 
variability in subjects may stem from such factors as the 
manner in which relevant information is presented and from 
the amount of information overload placed on the 
individual. Or, in keeping with the findings of the Rest, 
Turiel and Kohlberg study, the higher reasoner may not 
have been able to explain his preferred moral reasoning at 
that level of choice. As Rest argues, a subject's 
comprehension and preference often surpasses his/her level 
of "production" of moral reasoning (Rest, 1973). 
In considering these scores, one has to allow that 
these subjects, all college students, may be in 
transition. Previously Kohlberg had written that there is 
often evident a "retrogression" in the college years 
(Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). This retrogression has been 
reinterpreted as a transition - the break-up of 
conventional morality without the consolidation of a more 
principled morality (Rest, 1979). However, the 
generalized effect is one of upward movement. Lack of 
consolidation may have contributed generally to change in 
the direction predicted, consistent with the theory. It 
may also have contributed to the downward movement 
expressed by some subjects. 
Summary of Results: Hypothesis Two. 
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The main effect of locus of control was not 
significant for either P-score changes or D-score changes. 
The lack of statistical significance does not lend support 
to earlier studies which offer evidence to indicate that 
persons holding an internal locus of control withstand 
pressures to respond to instructions, suggestions or 
manipulations that run contrary to their ideas or beliefs 
(Jolley & Spielberger, 1973; Algre & Murray, 1974; 
Sherman, 1973). 
Implication and Limitations. 
Some studies suggest that certain factors make a 
difference in whether or not Internals allow themselves to 
be influenced. Crowne and Liverant (1963) revealed that 
when the "stakes" are of greater value to the individual, 
Internals are more trusting of their own judgments than 
are Externals. In this interaction, Internals may have 
"resisted" less, thereby compromising because they did not 
see much "at stake." Lefcourt contends that "if the 
expert or experimenter ... offers a more collegial 
atmosphere, the internal should not then be as resistant 
to influence as when he perceives himself as a target of 
manipulation" (1982, p. 49). 
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Several other studies (James, Woodruff & Werner, 
1965; Platt, 1969; Mausner & Platt, 1971) prompt another 
consideration. These investigations reveal that Internals 
do not simply resist any influence but discriminate which 
influences they will accept. When Internals accept and 
believe the information presented to them, they are more 
easily influenced to change. In the present study a lower 
reasoning External may have provided lucid, acceptable 
arguments for his/her choice. In keeping with the results 
of the Turiel study cited above, an Internal may have 
changed a higher reasoning preference that he/she could 
not explain for reasoning that was within his/her 
reasoning _"profile." 
While the main effect of locus of control was not 
significant in the ANOVA, the patterns of change indicate 
greater amount of change on the part of Externals and, 
therefore, more resistance on the part of Internals. 
For P-score changes the interaction of Reason x Locus 
demonstrated a significant effect in the ANOVA, but the 
Newman-Keuls follow-up tests failed to locate the source 
of the effect. While the F-test was sensitive and 
powerful enough to detect a significant difference in 
population means, the Newman-Keuls lacked the power to 
determine where the interaction occurs. Even if the 
effect is minimal, that effect cannot be dismissed. Lack 
of power in a follow-up test cannot be equated with lack 
of interaction. The ANOVA provides enough of a hint to 
warrant a replication of the study. A larger sample of 
subjects, better instruments of measure and greater 
heterogeneity of subjects would decrease the probability 
of error and strengthen the test statistic. 
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Because of the probability level (£ < .07) for the 
three-way interaction in the analysis of P-score changes 
and because of the "teasing" effect of the significant but 
elusive two-way interaction, tests for multiple 
comparisons for three-way interaction means were applied. 
The Duncan Multiple Range procedure, a less conservative 
test, indicated significance in the pattern of change 
revealed in the means. The pattern manifested that 
Same/Difference pairing denoted effects that are 
consistent with the predictions. 
Lower reasoning Internals changed more when paired 
with higher reasoning Internals. One can question if 
their resistance was lessened by more convincing 
discussion. Internals are reported to be more certain of 
and cohesive to their own beliefs. A combination of 
higher moral reasoning - usually the preference - and an 
Internal conviction may have affected the change. 
Lower reasoning Internals changed significantly less 
(M = 8.82) than lower reasoning Externals (M = 14.82) when 
paired with a different locus of control. The greatest 
amount of change came in higher reasoning Externals 
(M = -15.82) who were paired with lower reasoning 
Internals (M = 8.82). Here the cited "resistance" of the 
Internals would seem to be a factor in the downward 
movement of the Externals. 
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The results of the study support the basic tenets of 
the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment; the 
results also support a major finding in the Locus of 
Control research, namely, that Internals are more 
resistant to outside influences to change. A consequent 
implication for the theory of moral development is whether 
or not the theory allows for locus of control as a . 
moderating variable. Should the theory include a 
personality factor that qualifies the process if change is 
influenced by locus of control? 
Implications for Education 
Of practical consideration in these results are the 
implications for education - both in content and in 
technique - and its role in providing appropriate 
"opportunities" for social participation and role-taking 
that enhance the developmental process. 
A common reaction among subjects who participated in 
the post-test session was that the experience was "good," 
"great," "exciting" and "fun." Several subjects remarked 
that they never "sat around" and discussed issues like 
this. The experience forced them to think about how the 
other person thought and whether or not they could agree 
with that thinking. The latter consideration led them to 
think about why they could or could not agree. One of the 
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many criticisms of American education today is that 
students are not taught to think. More opportunities for 
role-taking and for . social participation would help to 
remedy this deficit while enhancing the cognitive-develop-
mental process involved in attaining higher levels of 
moral reasoning. 
Many school systems have introduced programs to 
promote moral development. To maximize the effects of 
programs concerning the cognitive-developmental theory ~f 
moral judgment, these efforts must take into account the 
concept of levels of moral reasoning and the concept of 
locus of control; and programs that influence levels of 
moral reasoning and locus of control have to be included. 
Future Directions 
Again, the data suggest that replication studies are 
warranted. In addition to the benefits derived from a 
larger sample, clearer results may be obtained with more 
carefully constructed instruments of measure. 
Considerable research in assessing the psychometric 
properties of the DIT P-score has been completed. Rest 
(1979) reports test-retest reliabilities for the P-index 
ranging from .71 to .82 and an internal consistency 
measure of .77. The D-index test-retest correlations 
reported by Rest (1979) range from .67 to .92. However, 
Rest (1986) states that in most recent studies (after 
1979) results of studies using the D-index have generally 
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not been as reliable as those using the P-index. He 
insists that the P-index has shown consistent reliability 
and validity. 
Test-retest reliability with individual stage scores 
is generally lower than that of the P-index, in the range 
of .50 to .60. 
Lawson's study (1986) demonstrated that certain 
dilemmas consistently elicited the same stage level of 
reasoning across subjects. One of her conclusions was 
that stage scores on the DIT are more a function of the 
dilemma issues than of any personality variable of the 
subject. Additional research on the psychometric 
properties of the DIT stage scores is essential. The 
D-score, as an overall index or moral judgment 
development, uses information from items of all stages 
rather than from Stage 5 and 6 items only. Since stage 
score reliabilities have not been systematically 
investigated, further research into the psychometric 
properties of the D-index are necessary to strengthen the 
reliability of the overall DIT. 
Numerous critical evaluations and reconceptualiza-
tions of the construct of locus of control and of its 
measurement have been published (Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 
1981; Palenzuela, 1984). Joe (1971) concluded that, while 
findings were not remarkably consistent, studies of the 
internal-external control concept evinced significant 
evidence for construct validity. Palenzuela (1984) 
concluded that recent investigations of the locus of 
control concept "rather than bring coherence to the area 
seem to create greater confusion" (p. 686). 
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various studies of the dimensionality of locus of 
control have been reported (Lefcourt, 1981). Rotter 
(1975) argued that such factor analyses do not reveal the 
true structure of the construct. He explained that factor 
analyses were done in the early development of the I-E 
scale and these showed that most of the variance was 
accounted for by one general factor. Palenzuela (1984) 
demonstrated that "the dimensionality of locus of control 
is something which is still somewhat ambiguous and 
confused in spite of the studies being carried out. Both 
the number of dimensions and their meaning is somewhat 
arbitrary" (p. 697). Thus, despite the popularity of the 
construct and the plethora of research involving it, there 
is little agreement about the validity of the instruments 
purported to measure the construct. 
Results of this study warrant future replication. In 
addition to a larger number of subjects and improved 
scales for measurement, greater heterogeneity in the pool 
of subjects would give more range in scores on the DIT and 
on the Rotter Locus of Control Scale. Conclusions from 
this study were based on a New England community college 
population who derived mainly from the working class and 
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lower middle class. Most of the subjects' ages were 
18-21. Studies should be conducted with populations that 
vary in their demographic characteristics. 
As a replication this researcher would like to have 
the influence situation again be one in which each pair 
discussed their original answers and the reasons for their 
choices. Each subject would try to convince his/her 
partner of the validity of that choice. In a change in 
procedure, subjects would then individually take the DIT a 
second time after the shared discussion. At the 
de-briefing session some subjects explained that they 
compromised on some answers even though they still 
believed their choice was best. Taking the DIT alone for 
the second time may eliminate changes resulting from a 
spirit of or need to compromise. At the same time that it 
may reveal more or different change patterns, it can 
certainly suggest something about the effect of influence 
relative to the maintenance of changes in reasoning in a 
post-test situation. 
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM: ATTITUDES and OPINIONS 
I understand that: 
1. I will be asked to discuss my opinions about six 
social problems with one other person. 
2. Together we will be asked to come to agreement on 
the questions concerninq the six social problems. 
3. Discussion and completion of the questionnaire will 
take approximately one hour. 
4. I will be given the results of the study when the 
questionnaires have been analyzed by a standard 
computer scoring system. 
5. I realize that my honest answers to the questions 
are essential. I understand that there may not be 
any direct benefits to me, but that this research 
could yield important information about the atti-
tudes and opinions of students. 
6. I am participating freely and may withdraw at any-
time. I can refuse to answer any questions that I 
do not wish to answer. There will be no penalty to 
my grade and withdrawal will in no way affect my 
standing as a student. 
CERTIFICATE of ASSENT 
I understand each of the above items relating to the 
participation of in the research 
(Name of Subject) 
of "Attitudes and Opinions" under the direction of 
Jane Carey and I hereby agree to my participation in 
Investigator 
the research project. 
* 





This is a questionnaire to find out the way in 
which certain important events in our society affect 
different people. Each item consists of a pair of al-
ternatives lettered "a" or "b''. Please select the one 
statement of each pair (and only one) which you more 
strongly BELIEVE to be the case as far as you're con-
cerned. Be sure to select the one you actually BELIEVE 
to be more true rather than the one you think you should 
choose or the one you would like to be true. This is a 
measure of personal belief: obviously there are no right 
. or wrong answers. 
Please answer these items CAREFULLY but do not spend 
too much time on any one item. Be sure to find an ans-
wer for EVERY choice. Find the number of the item on 
the answer sheet and black-in the space under "a" or 
"b" which you choose as the statement more true. 
In some instances you may discover that you believe 
both statements are neither one. In such cases, be sure 
to select the ONE you more strongly believe to be the 
case as far as you're concerned. Also try to respond to 
each item INDEPENDENTLY when making your choice: do not 










Children get into trouble because their parents 
punish them too much. 
The trouble with most children nowadays is that 
their parents are too easy with them. 
82 
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are 
partly due to bad luck. 
People's misfortunes result from the mistakes 
they make. 
One of the major reasons why we have wars is be-
cause people don't take enough interest in poli-
tics. 
There will always be wars, no matter how hard 
people try to prevent them. 
In the long run people get the respect they de-
serve in this world. 
Unfortunately, an individual's worth often pass-
es unrecognized no matter how hard he tries. 






b. Most students don't realize the extent to which 










Without the right breaks one cannot be an effec-
tive leader. 
Capable people who fail to become leaders have 
not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
No matter how hard you try some people just 
don't like you. 
People who can't get others to like them don't 
understand how to get along with others. 
Heredity plays the major role in determining 
one's personality. 
It is one's experience in life which determine 
what they're like. 
I have often found that what is going to happen 
will happen. 
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for 
me as making a decision to take a definite course 
of action. 
10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is 
rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated 
to course work that studying is really useless. 
11. a. becomi~g a success is a matter of hard work, 
luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on be ~.ng in 
the riqht place at the right time. 
12. a. The a v erage citizen can have an influence in 
government decisions. 
b. This world is run by the few people in power, 
ar.d the~e is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I 
can make them work. 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead be-
cause many things turn out to be a matter of 
good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good. 
15. 
b. There is some good in everybody. 
a. 
b. 
In my case getting what I want has little or 
nothing to do with luck. 
Many times we might just as well decide what to 




Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was 
lucky enough to be in the right place first. 
Getting people to do the right thing depends upon 









As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us 
are the victims of forces we can neither under-
stand, nor control. 
By taking an active part in political and social 
affairs the people can control world events. 
Most people don't realize the extent to which 
their lives are cont~olled by accidental hap-
penings. 
There really is no such thing as "luck". 
One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
It ~s usually best to cover up one's ~istakes. 
It is hard t~ know whether or not a person really 
likes you. 
How many friends you have depends upon how nice 
a persor. you are. 
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us 


















Most misfortunes are t h e resu~t of lack of 
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
With ~no ugh effort we can wipe out political 
corrupt:on. 
It is dif:icult for people to have much control 
over the things politicians do in office. 
Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive 
at the grades they give. 
There is a direct connection between how hard I 
study and the grades I get. 
A good leader expects people to decide for them-
selves what they should do. 
A good leader makes it clear to everybody what 
their jobs are. 
Many times I feel that I have little influence 
over the things that happen to me. 
It is impossible for me to believe that chance 
or luck plays an important role in my life. 
People are lonely because they don't try to be 
friendly. · 
There's not much use in trying too hard to 
please peop:e, if they like you, they like you. 
There is too much emphasis on athletics i~ high 
school. 
Team S?Orts are an excellent way to build char-
acter. 
What happens ~o me is my own doing. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control 
over the direction my life is taking. 
Most of the time I can't understand why politi-
cians behave the way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for 





OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how 
people think about social problems. Different people 
often have different opinions about questions of right 
and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way that 
there are right answers to math problems. We would like 
you to tell us what you think about several problem stor-
ies. The papers will be fed to a computer to find the 
average for the whole group, and no one will see your 
individual answers. 
Please give us the following information: 
Name 








In this questionnaire you will be asked to give 
your opinions about several stories. Here is a story 
as an example. Read it, then turn to the next page. 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. 
* 
He is married, has two small children and earns an aver-
age income. The car he buys will be his family's only 
car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive 
around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In 
trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized 
that there were a lot of questions to consider. On the 
next page there is a list of some of these questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each 
of these questions be in deciding what car to buy? 
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PART A. (SAMPI.£) 
On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each 





PART 8. (Saple) 
2. Would a~ car be 110re economical in the 
long run than a!!!!! car. 
3. Whether the color was green, Frank's 
favorite color. 
,. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at 
least 200. 
S. Would a large, roomy car be better than a 
compact car. 
6. Whether the front connibilie! were 
d1fferent1a1. 
Frm tM 11st of questions above, select the ~ 1aportant one of the 
wholt group. Put the nUlllber of the ■ost important question on the top 
line below. Do likewise fr,r your 2nd, 3rd, and ,th 110st important 
choices. 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third ■ost important 
Fourth ■ost important 
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HEINZ AHO THE DRUG 
In Europe I wcman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There 
was one drug that the .doctors thought 111 ght save her. It was a fonn of 
r1d11111 t.~at I druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The 
drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten ti■es what 
the drug cost to ■ake. He paid $200 for the radii.Ill .,d charged $2000 for 
1 111111 dose of the drug. The sick wanan's husband, Heinz, went to 
everyone he knew to .borrow the 110ney, but he coult' only get together 
about SlOOO, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that 
his wife was dying, and asked him to sell 1t cheaper or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, . •No, 1 discovered the drug and l 'm going 
to ■ake 1110ney from it.• So Heinz got desperate end began to think about 
breaking into the ■an's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the crug? (Check one) 
Should steal it 
Can't decide 







On the 1,1: hand side~ tne page 
check one of the spaces by each 
Question to indicate 1ts importance. 
1. Whether a canr.:unity's laws al"t vo~ng to be upheld. 
2. Isn't it only natural for a iov1ns husband to care 
so •uch for hi$ w1fe tnat he'd steal? 
3. Is He,nz w11llng to risk 9tttin; shot u a burglar 
O" 90,n; to j&11 for the cnance that sterling the 
ct:"'Ug •1ght help? 
'· Whether Hei nz 1s I professional wrestler, or has 
cons,oerable 1nf1uence with professional 
""st lers. 
5. Whether Heinz 1s stealin~ for himself or doing 
tt-1\ solely to help Mlll~ne else. 
6. Wtiet~er the druggist's rights to his inve"tion 
have to be respected. 
7. wnetne- the essence of living 1s ~re er.~passing 
tn111 tl'lt tenninatior. of dying, so:,i1ly and 
ind1vicual1y. 
a. Wnr. values re 901n9 to be the basis for 
povr.-n1n~ tl0lt peop1e act towaras tacn other. 
t. llftett,t,,, the crugg1st 1s poing to be a1iowed to 
h10f- behind I wor-thltss 1• which only protects 
the r'i di 1r1yn0111. 
10. Whether the law 1r. th1! case is getting ;n t~e way 
----- of thtaost bas1c cla,s of .. yNIIIOer of society. 
11. llhethr. the cru9~1st atserves tc be robotd for 
----- being SG prHdy and cruel. . 
12. litculd sttt11ng 1n such a case D!"inr, about aot'e 
----- totti eooa for the wnole society C'" not. 
,,,. the 11st of e,,est1ans lbove, select tne four aos-.. 111?0rtant: 
·Most ,111or-tant 
Second aost 111Por-t1nt 
Th1ro ■ost 1111or-t1nt 
Fourth aost iaoortant 
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STUDENT TAKE-OVER 
At Harvard University a group of students, called the . Students for a 
Democratic Society (SOS), believe that the University should not have an 
anny ROTC program. SOS students are against the war in Viet 11am, and tht 
an11y training program helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SOS 
students dl!manded that Harvard end the anny ROTC training prog,-an as a 
university course. This 1110uld ean that Harvard students could not get 
ar11y training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for 
it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing w1th the SOS students, the Harvard professors voted to end 
the ROTC progran as a university course. But the President of the 
Uniwrsity stated that he wanted to keep the ITffly program on canmus as a 
course. The SOS students felt that the President was not going tr . pay 
attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day last April, two hundred SOS students walked into the 
uniwrs1ty's ldllllin1stration building, and told everyone else to 91t out. 
They said they W1"t doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army 
training progr• u a course. 
Should tM students have taken over the ldlllinistration building? (Cneck 
one) 
_ Yes, they should take 1t over 
Can't decide 





1. Are the students doin9 this to really help 
other pecp1e o.- i!"e tney doing 1t for kicks. 
2. Do the student~ nave any right to taKe over 
property tna~ c~esn't belong to their.. 
3. Do the stuoent : realize that they might be 
arrested and fined, and even expelled from 
sc!'loo l. 
,. Would tak1n9 over the building in the long run 
benefit ■ort people to a greater extent. 
5. Whether the oresident stayed within the limits 
ot his 11.1tho-~ty in ignoring the faculty vote. 
6. Will tht tak~,ver anger the publ1c and give 
111 s~uoents t Dad nirne. 
7. ls taking over a tiuilding consistent with 
principles of justice. 
8. Wou1e allowing one student take-over encourage 
a any other student tak~-overs. 
9. 01c tM pres~dent bring this misunderstanding 
on himself b! being so unreasonable and 
uncoo e>er at i ve • 
10. Whether n,,ning the 111~versity ought to be in 
the hands of I fe,, administrators or in the 
hands of a 11 the people. 
11. A,-e tht students following principles which 
they be 1 i eve are above the 1 aw. 
12. Whether or not 111iversity decisions ought to 
be respected by students. 
Frm the 11st of questions above, select the four 110st illl1)0rtant: 
Most 11111>0rtant 
Setond ■ost 111Po--tant 
Thi rd aost 11111>ortant 
Fourth most important 
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ESCAPED PRISONER 
A man had been sentenctd to prison for 10 years. After one year, 
however, he escaped fran prison, moved to a new area of the country, 
and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and 
gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. H! was fa1r 
to his custaners, gave his anployees top wages, and gave 110st of his 
own profits to charity. Then one day Mrs. Jones, an old n!"1ghbor, 
recognized him as the ■an who had escaped fr0111 prison S years before, 
and whan the police had been lookin; for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the POlice and have him sent 
back to prison? (Check one) 
_ Should report him 
Can't decide 





l ,. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such 
a long t1me to prove he isn't a bad person? 
z. Everyt1me someone scapes punistwnent for a 
crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime? 
?. Wouldn't • · be b!';ter off without prisons and 
the oppress,on o~ our legal system? 
c. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to 
society? 
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson 
sould fa irly expect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from 
society, especially for a cnaritable man? 
7. How a>uld anyone be so cruel and heartless as 
to send Mr. Thomcson to prison? 
8. Would it be fair to a11 the prisoners who had 
to serve out their full sentences if 
Mr. Tham:>son was let off? 
9. Wu Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an 
escaped eriminal. regar~less of the 
circll!lstances? 
11. How .ould the w111 of the people and the 
public good best be served? 
12. Would going to prison do any good for 
Mr. Thompson or protect anybody? 
Fraa the 11st of questions above, select th~ four aost important: 
Most 1~0-. .ant 
Second •ost important 
Third •ost important 
Fourth •ost 1m:,ortant 
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NEWSPAPn 
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a ■imeographed 
newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He 
wanted to speak out against the war in Viet Nmn and to speak out against 
sane of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long 
hair. 
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for 
per,niss1on. The princ1pa1 said it 1110uld be all right if before every 
pub11c:at1on Fred would turn in all his articles for the pr1ncipa1's 
a~roval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. ihe 
principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper 
1n the next t1110 weeks. 
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would 
receive so ■uch attention. Students were so excited by the paper that 
they began to organize protests agains the h:&1r egulation and other 
school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's op1n1ons. They pnoned 
the pr1nc1pal telling h1■ that the newspaper was ll\patriot1: anc should 
not be published. As a result of the rising exc1tenent, the principal 
ordered Fred to stop pub11sh1ng. He ~ve a reason that Fred'~ activities 
were disruptive to the operation of the school. 
Should the pr1nc1pa1 stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
_ Should stop it 
Can't decide 
_ Should not stop 1t 
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"""'" ~~ _____ 1. Is the principal 110re responsible to students or to 
parents? 
----- 2. Did the principal give his .ord that the newspaoer could be published for a long time, or did he just 
promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time? 
3. Would the students start protesting even more 1f the 
principal stopped the newspaper? 
4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does 
the principal have the right to give orders to 
students? 
S. Does the principal have the f-reedom of speech to say 
•no• in this case? 
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper .ould he be 
preventing full discussion of important problems? 
7. Whether the principal's order .ould make Free lose 
faith in the principal? 
8. Whether Fred WIS really loyal to his school and 
patr1ot1c to his country. 
9. What effect .ould stopping the paper have I'll\ the 
student's education tn critical thinking ar.d 
Jud~ent? 
10. Whether Fred was in rr,y way violating the rights of 
- - - - - others 1n publishing his own opinions. 
11. Whether the principal should be influenced by same 
- - - - - angry parents when 1t 1s the pr1nc1pa1 that knows 
best .tiat ts poing on 1n the scnool. 
12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper tc stir up 
- - - - - hatred 1nd d1 scontent. 
Fraa the 11st of questions above, select the foU1' ■ost important: 
Most important 
Second ■ost important 
Third most 1aportant 
Fourth ■ost iapo:tant 
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WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted 
to hire another aecnanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to 
find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good aechanic was 
Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While M~. Webster himself didn't have 
anything against orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many 
of his custaners didn't likt orientals. His custarners might take their 
business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asled Mr. Webster if he could hav~ the job, Mr. Webster 
said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really 
hid not hired anybody, because he could not fine: anybody who was a good 
•chan i c besides M':-. Lee. 
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one) 
Should hive hired Mr. Lee 
Can't decide 
Should not have hired him 
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2. Whether tnere is a law that foro1ds racial 
d1scr~~ination 1n hiring for jobs. 
3. k.lhethe- Mr. Webste!" is pn ,'.udicec against 
or-ienu1s himself or whetner he means notr.ing 
personal in refusing the job. 
4. Whether hiring a good 11echanic or oay-,rig 
atte!'ltion to his custaners' wishes would be best 
for his business. 
5. What individual differences ough~ to be relevant 
in oe-:iding how society's roles are filled? 
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic 
systt!l'. ou;nt to be completely abandoned. 
7. Do a ~P.,jo!"ity of peocle in Mr. Wet ster"s society 
fee : l ike his custantrs or are a n:ajority against 
preJudice? 
S. Whetner hiring capable aen like Mr. Lee would use 
talents t ~at would otne!"WiSe be lost to society. 
9. Would -, 4 ~:;~ ~ the jot i ~ Mr. Let bt consistent 
with M,-. itet-;.ter's own moral be:i ~s? 
10. COl:1d Mr. •e~ster be so hard-hearted l~ te refuse 
tht Joe, kno-'\ng how ■uch it aeans tc ~ •• ee? 
11. Whr.rier th! Ctr-1st1an C011111anciller,~ tt love ,our 
fe1iow ■II'\ app1ies to this case. 
12. If SC11e-:>ne's 1n need, shouldn't he bt M1ped 
- - - - - regardless of what ,ou get back frClll him? 
FraD the 11_st of •stions above, select the four aost ia;,o-unt: 
Most important 
Seconc ■ost important 
Third ■est i111Portant 
Fourth ■est i~ortant 
TH£ OOCTOR Is DILEMl"A 
A lady was dying of cancer which c:ould not be cured an, she nad only 
about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak 
that I good dose of pain-killer like 110rphine woulc make her die sooner. 
She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, 
she would ask the doctor to g1ve her enough 1110rphine to k111 her. She 
said she couldn't staMd the pain and that she was going to die in a fN 
110nths anyway. 
What should the dcc~or de? (Check one) 
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_ He should give the lady an overdose 
tnat will make her oie 
Can't decide 
_ Should not give her an overdose 
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g1Yi ng her the overdose or not. 
2. Is the cilctor oblfgattd by the sne laws as 
everybody else ff giv1ng an overdose ..:>tJld be 
the sae u k1111ng her. 
3. Whether people .ould be aucJi better aff 
without society f"tgi■tnting thefr lives and 
even their deaths. 
4. Whether the cilctor could ■akt ft appear like 
., accident. 
5. Does the state hive the right tr> force 
continued existence on thost who don't want to 
11ve. 
6. What fs the value af death prior to society's 
pen pect 1Ye on person a 1 v a 1 ues • 
7. Whether the cilctor his S)ffl;)athy for the waman' s
suffering or cares ■ore about what society 
■ight think. 
8. Is he 1 ping to end .,other• s 1 if e ever a 
resp~nsiblt act of cooperation. 
9. Whether only .od should decide when a persOf'l'S 
11fe sho~ld end. 
10. What values the cilctor has set for hfaself 1n 
111s NI personal codl of behavior. 
U. Can society afford to let anybody end tnefr 
11 ves when they want to. 
12. Can society allc. su1c1des or ~cy l:1111ng 
lfld still protect tht lives of indiv1dua1~ who 
want to 11Yt. 
Frm the 11st of questions lbow. select tnt four ac,st 1aportlJ'it. 
Most 1aportant 
Second ■ost 1ai,ortant 
Third ■ost 1aportant 
Fourth ■ost 1aportant 
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